Religious Perspectives of College Teaching in Political Science

John H. Hallowell

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PREFACE TO THE SERIES OF ESSAYS

Three years ago Professor George F. Thomas of Princeton University, in a letter to The Edward W. Hazen Foundation, urged the need for careful studies by natural scientists, social scientists, and humanistic scholars concerning the religious issues, implications and responsibilities involved in the teaching of their respective disciplines. This pamphlet is part of a series instituted by The Edward W. Hazen Foundation for the purpose of carrying Professor Thomas' suggestion into the sphere of fruitful inquiry and discussion. Under the sponsorship of The Foundation, the undersigned committee has enlisted the aid of distinguished scholars deeply interested in the relations between religion and higher education. Each of these scholars will discuss the problem in its specific pertinence to his own field of learning, his own conception of his intellectual and spiritual responsibilities to his students, to the institution which he serves, and to society in general. He will address himself primarily to fellow-teachers in his field, secondarily to students and to interested members of the educated public.

The committee responsible for the survey wishes to steer a course between two opposite dangers; that of a theological vagueness which would produce nothing but noncommittal generalities, and that of a dogmatism which would alienate all but a small number of readers. The views of the authors of these essays may vary from liberal to orthodox interpretations of religion. Throughout this diversity, however, runs a common denominator which is shared by the authors and by the members of the committee. Religion is not nature-worship, or man-worship, or science-worship. It is not the totality of human value. Although it is metaphysical, ethical, and humanitarian, it cannot be equated with metaphysics, or ethics, or humanitarianism. Religion is man's quest for communion with an ultimate spiritual reality completely independent of human desires and imaginings. Religion apprehends this Absolute Reality and Value in faith, and seeks to give concrete embodiment to the ineffable in creed, cult, and conduct. The creative power of the universe is not an intellectual abstraction but an objective entity, a Divine Being. Although God infinitely transcends our human nature and understanding, He most potently reveals Himself to those who conceive of Him in personal terms. Thus symbolized, He becomes

for us not merely Cosmic Mind, but Creator, Judge and Redeemer of mankind.

Within this broad but positive consensus the authors of these essays will exercise complete freedom in expressing their personal views. As regards the relevance of religion for higher education there is also general agreement among those associated with this survey. The cleavage which divides intellectual from spiritual life is probably the most ominous defect of modern civilization. "High religion and intellectual enterprise belong together," says Professor Robert L. Calhoun. "Each gains from close association with the other. The two in conjunction, but neither one by itself, can move with hope toward more effective conquest of the chaos that again and again threatens to engulf human living. That way lies whatever chance we may have for a more humane world."

In his essay *Colleges, Faculties and Religion,* appraising consultations with more than fifty faculties, Professor Albert C. Outler reports that "Education is by way of being reformed with little or no regard for the possible contribution of religion to its reformation. For a very tangled skein of reasons, it has come to pass that, in the name of tolerance and the democratic spirit, American educators (whatever their private beliefs and convictions) have in fact suppressed the consideration of the problems of the religious interpretation of reality and human existence in the educational process." He sees, however, evidence that religion will become increasingly influential in American higher education if it can receive "a fair hearing in the open forum of American academic discussion . . . . Where this is done, there is usually a vigorous and generally favorable reaction from both faculty and students."

To obtain such a "fair hearing" from a large academic audience is the purpose of these essays. Even in these days of "general education," however, the modern scholar remains a specialist. He is likely to be less interested in the general problem of the place of religion in higher education than in the specific problem of how religion pertains to the teaching of his particular subject. This more specialized aspect of the question deserves more careful investigation than it has hitherto received. At present, therefore, these essays are being published as separate pamphlets so that each may appeal directly to those concerned with the discipline which it discusses.

It is hoped, however, that the project may prove fruitful enough to justify later publication in a single volume or perhaps in three shorter books devoted respectively to the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities.

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RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

John H. Hallowell

I.

It is probably a healthy sign of vitality that political scientists in recent years have been giving more and more attention to the problem of methodology. For there is much confusion among us as to what political science is and little agreement concerning its exact nature and scope. Yet, in concentrating our attention upon problems of method, it seems to me that we are approaching the problem backwards. We are all very much concerned about the research methods and teaching techniques which we ought to employ as political scientists but we give little or no attention to the *kind* of knowledge of which we are in search. What *kind* of knowledge is it that we want to find and disseminate among our colleagues and students? We must first answer that question, it seems to me, before we can possibly decide whether the research techniques we are using will reveal the kind of information of which we are in search.

I do not mean, of course, that we can know in advance of our search exactly what we shall find but I do mean that we have to know in advance of our search the *kind* of thing for which we are looking. Are we looking, for example, for causal laws of political behavior or are we looking for principles that can guide us in making wise political decisions and means of implementing them in actual situations that confront us here and now?

Whether a method is a good one or not depends upon whether it will yield the kind of information we are looking for, whether it is most appropriate to the object of the search. The physicist does not ask the kinds of questions which the philosopher asks and we do not expect the methods he employs to yield answers, therefore, to the questions which the philosopher asks. Neither do we expect the philosophical method to yield information about the physical laws of the universe or the structure of atoms. Should we use the method of the physicist or the method of the philosopher? Framed in this way the question is unanswerable. It all depends upon what *kind* of information we are looking for.

To many political scientists this does not appear as a problem because for them political science is simply concerned with the discovery and dissemination of the *facts* about politics. I think we

can all agree upon that. Differences of opinion among us, however, immediately occur when we ask further: what *are* the facts? and, given the facts, what do they mean?

The facts about politics, or about anything else, are by no means self-evident and none of us, moreover, ever succeeds in knowing or in imparting all of them. Facts do not present themselves to us already labeled but we attach labels to them. Facts do not seek us out but we seek them out. And the kind of facts we find depends upon the conceptual presuppositions from which we begin our search for them. The facts we find depend in large measure upon the kinds of *questions* we ask and the kinds of questions we ask depend upon what we think it is both possible and appropriate to know.

None of us, moreover, ever succeeds in finding or in imparting all the facts about anything. Of necessity, and in order to be intelligible, we emphasize some facts and ignore others. When we undertake a research project or endeavor to describe the organization and function of some political institution to our students we have, of necessity, to employ some principle of selection in our choice of facts. We do not regard all facts as being equally significant but, consciously or subconsciously, focus our attention upon some facts and ignore others. If we do not consciously employ some principle of selection, if we do not employ some principle of evaluation in terms of which we decide that some facts are significant and others insignificant, we shall not succeed in being intelligible. The facts we find and present will be relevant to nothing and hence meaningless. Without an underlying principle of selection we shall have but a conglomeration of assorted facts without meaning or value. And no science was ever established upon a conglomeration of unrelated facts. It is not a distinguishing characteristic of the scientific method that it proceeds without some principle of selection. On the contrary, it is by adopting one principle of selection in preference to another that the various sciences are made possible and one is distinguished from another. Every science is interested in facts but each is interested in a different kind of fact. The object of knowledge is different in each case. And each science employs a method most appropriate to the discovery of that object.

Before we can decide what method is most appropriate for the study of politics we must first decide what the object of our search

is. How do the kind of facts we want to find differ, for example, from those which the physicist wants to find? What kind of knowledge is peculiar to political science?

II.

Whatever else political science may be concerned with it is certainly concerned first and foremost with the behavior of human beings. It is not concerned with the behavior of atoms. And while the methods of physics are entirely appropriate to the study of the behavior of atoms they are not appropriate to the study of human behavior unless, as some may declare—if only for the sake of argument—that man is nothing but a complex, physical apparatus. The very fact that we can entertain such a notion about ourselves, for the sake of argument, seems to me to be itself sufficient refutation of the fact which that argument seeks to uphold. Atoms don't argue. Human beings do. Atoms don't entertain conceptions about themselves but human beings do.

Atoms cannot deliberate over alternative ways of behaving but men can. A man can *think* about the situation in which he finds himself, he can entertain conceptions about the end or ends which he would like to achieve and he can deliberate upon the means best calculated to achieve his purpose. Human behavior can never be completely explained in terms of the external forces acting upon it—we must always reckon with the human agent himself and with his freedom to choose between alternative ways of acting. While there are situations in which human behavior appears to be coerced or compelled by forces outside the control of the human agent there are many more situations in which the individual is able to choose between alternative modes of action. Indeed, it is one of the distinguishing characteristics of humanity that man is able both to choose between alternative ways of acting and to deliberate upon that choice. This fact is both the source of man's greatness and the source of his degradation.

Now physics is a science which deals with things which cannot possibly be otherwise than they are. It is concerned with relations which are entirely independent of human volition. It is a search for *necessary* relations. But because political science deals with the behavior of human beings it is not a science of that kind. The behavior of human beings is never completely predictable but only

probable. Political science is concerned not with that which is absolutely necessary but with that which is contingent. It deals with things which may be other than they are. And for that reason it is not a speculative science but a practical one.

Because it is a practical science, political science is more like engineering than it is like physics. The physicist is interested in discovering the physical laws of the universe for their own sake. Whether his discoveries have any practical significance or application is not his concern. But the practical application of the principles discovered by physics is the peculiar concern of the engineer. The engineer is not interested in the principles of physics for their own sake but in order that he may design and construct bridges and not bridges in the abstract but particular bridges at particular places. Obviously he must know something about the principles of physics if the bridges he builds are not to collapse but he does not need to know as much about these principles as the physicist does nor to know them in exactly the same way.

Similarly, political science is a practical science. It is concerned with speculation not for the sake of speculation but for the sake of *action.* It is not concerned with the abstract "will" to achieve an abstract "power" but with the particular wills of particular individuals in specific places. An abstract "will" is a non-existent will and a "power" divorced from the strivings of particular individuals is a non-existent "power." Power describes a two-way relationship between individuals and in every power relationship there is an element of consent, be it small or large. Since power is not a substantive thing but a relational concept, since it exists only in purposeful action, it can never be a self-sufficient end but only a means toward the attainment of purposes or ends more ultimate than power itself. One of the inadequacies of the definition of politics as a struggle for power is that it obscures, if it does not obliterate, the *purposes* in terms of which power is sought and used and the conflict of purposes out of which politics emerges.

For it is the conflict of purposes that characterizes politics—not the struggle for a "power" divorced from all purposeful motivation. Politics emerges out of the conflict between the wills and interests of particular individuals living in particular societies. And politics is successful when it succeeds in reconciling these individual wills and interests in terms of an interest or good which is common to

all. The end of politics is policy—the integration of conflicting interests in terms of certain interests and values which are held in common. The statesman differs from the ordinary politician in that he is able to envisage and inspire support for policies that are in the *ultimate,* best interest of the most people and however rare the statesman may be we think of him rightly as the politician *par excellence.* To the extent that the ordinary politician's vision is limited to that which is immediately expedient, to the extent that he is motivated by narrow, sectional, group or personal interests we think of him as a failure and the more narrow his vision and selfish his aim the greater the failure.

Although politics comes into being as the result of the conflict between individual wills and interests it presupposes the existence of an interest or good which is common to all, for without this basis for reconciliation there could be no politics. There is a sense in which politics may accurately be described as the art of compromise. But compromise can never be the end of politics because no one likes compromise for its own sake. We are willing to make compromises, when we do make them, because we value some things more than we do the things which we are compromising. Compromise presupposes some agreement upon principles in terms of which compromise may take place. Without some conception of a common good, of a good which is the same for all of us as human beings, there would be no possibility of reconciling our differences in terms of a common purpose or policy, and, hence, no politics.

As a practical science political science is interested in knowledge not for the sake of knowledge alone but for the sake of action. And the action at which politics aims is policy, and, more specifically, legislation. For it is through legislation that policy takes shape and form and the coercive power of the state is put behind it. But the policy at which politics aims is not just any policy but a policy designed to promote the good or well-being of the persons for whom it is designed. The legislation which embodies policy if it is to command the allegiance and respect of those for whom it is framed must conform in intention and in content to that which is just. For although men can be compelled, at least outwardly, to obey a bad or unjust law their interests and wills will not be truly reconciled and integrated unless that law is a just one and politics, as we have said, aims at reconciliation and integration. A strong,

stable, and genuine political order depends upon the freely given consent of the governed and although a spurious kind of consent can be manufactured to a degree through the techniques of propaganda, a genuine, freely given consent can never be coerced into existence. Despite its outward appearance of strength a tyranny is actually the most unstable form of government. It is the political manifestation not of order but of anarchy. Compulsion replaces consent in every sphere of life because there is no common agreement obliging consent in any sphere.

I have suggested earlier that there is a similarity between political science and engineering for both, I have argued, are practical rather than theoretical sciences. But there is also a significant difference between them. For the one is concerned with *doing* and the other with *making*. The objects with which engineering deals are inanimate, material things and the engineer is concerned with shaping or making those things into useful objects, such as buildings, bridges, highways, etc. The materials are transformed by the engineer in conformity with some useful purpose which he has in mind. The purpose does not inhere in the things themselves but in the mind of the engineer. Enginering is a science of making things, a productive science or technology. The products of technology may be used for good purposes or bad, but once made the technician's task is completed.

The objects with which engineering deals are inanimate, material things but the objects with which political science is concerned are human beings—human beings who are not things but souls, or, if you like, personalities. Human beings cannot be manipulated like material objects and any attempt to do so will be destructive of their very essence. They are not like so many bricks or pieces of steel that have only to be laid in the right place according to a blueprint. They can cooperate or rebel. Moreover "we do not build a state to live *in* (as we live in a house)—we live the state. Our living state is an integral part of our lives. Here the builders are what they build."[1]

Political science is unlike engineering in that it is not technology, it is concerned with *doing* rather than with making. In order for political science to accomplish its purpose the knowledge it pro-

[1] Helmut Kuhn, "Thought and Action," *Journal of Politics*, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 457.

vides must be translated into human action. And political science comes into being in order to assist men in doing that which they are naturally predisposed to do. Man is by nature a social being. He requires the fellowship and services of other men. He does not create society but is born into it. Steel doesn't have to be made into bridges, it has no inherent predisposition to be anything—it can be manipulated and used in any fashion the engineer decides is appropriate to his purpose. But human beings are predisposed to live in society and embody ends in themselves. Men are not content to exist, it is not life alone they want but a good life. And political science comes into being in order to assist men in finding the means that will foster a good life among men.

For these reasons political science is more like the physician's art than it is like the science of engineering. The normal body of the human organism naturally tends towards health. When the body becomes diseased or disordered medical therapy consists in trying to help the organism to cure itself, to assist nature in doing what nature is already predisposed to do. The physician ministers to ends which nature itself pursues. So political science ministers to an end which is not of its own devising but which is inherent in life itself. It comes into being in order to help men to live a good life in society. It does not invent that end but finds that end inherent in all human striving. The task of the statesman is more like the task of the physician than it is like the task of the engineer. It is practical wisdom rather than productive knowledge that is required both of the statesman and of the physician. The statesman is not concerned with making anything but rather with inspiring right action and right action cannot be divorced from right reason for "to divorce action from thought in politics means to sever the conscience of mankind from its deeds."[2]

If all this be true what then can be said about the kind of knowledge at which political science aims? It seems to me that the kind of knowledge at which political science aims, or ought to aim, is practical knowledge of the best means of promoting justice among men. I say justice because justice is the name we use to describe a good life in society. The best political order will be a just one—when each member of that order fulfills those social tasks for which

[2] *Ibid*, p. 476.

he is best fitted by virtue and capacity and each is rewarded in proportion to his contribution. No actual political order is ever completely just and each falls short in some way or another of perfection, but by having a standard of justice we are enabled to recognize these shortcomings and to know in what particulars actual political systems fall short of the ideal. Not only must the political scientist know what ideally is the best constitution for the state but he must investigate the various types of existing constitutions in order to discover how they fall short of the ideal, in what particulars, and how they can be improved. He must try to discover what kind of constitution or system of government is best suited to particular peoples at particular times and places. He must investigate the causes of revolution, how constitutions in general and particular constitutions have been and are liable to be destroyed. He must investigate how government can be operated most efficiently in order to realize the ends for which it exists. He must consider how much or how little regulation of this or that activity will best promote justice among the members of the particular society. He must consider the foreign policy which a particular state ought to pursue in order to promote justice among the nations and peoples of the world and the best means of defending the integrity of the state from those who would destroy it, whether through internal rebellion or external aggression. In short, the function of political science, as I see it, is not simply the description of existing policy and governmental organization but the analysis of that policy and organization in terms of the end for which the state exists. Perhaps the task of politics has never been more succinctly expressed than in the words of Pascal, when he said: "It is right that what is just should be obeyed; it is necessary that what is strongest should be obeyed. Justice without power is impotent and power without justice is tyrannical. We must then combine justice and power, and for this end make what is just strong or what is strong, just." The reconciliation of power and justice through law is the never ending task of politics. A political science that concentrates upon problems of power to the neglect of considerations of justice is concerned, at best, with but one-half of the political problem.

The way in which we conceive of the end of the state depends upon what we conceive to be the end of man. Before we can decide

whether a policy is a good one, whether it will promote the best interests of human beings, we must first ask ourselves: what *is* man? What is his essential nature and ultimate destiny? And in seeking answers to these questions we may very well be led to ask an additional question, namely, who is man? It is not, indeed, the function of political science to answer these questions but political science cannot adequately fulfill the tasks peculiar to it until it has sought answers to those questions and sought them from the disciplines most competent to answer them. The political scientist cannot know whether the means he prescribes are appropriate, adequate, and possible unless he knows the nature of man and the end for which he is destined. For knowledge concerning the nature of man and that which is good for him as a human being, political science must, of necessity, look outside itself to other disciplines. It must look to psychology, to philosophy, especially to ethics and religion.

What difference does it make to politics and to political science what conception of man we accept? It makes, it seems to me, just this difference — that our political philosophies and systems of government will be based upon conceptions of man's nature and destiny that are more or less true. If our conception of man's essential nature and ultimate destiny is false, *i.e.* unreal, we may be led to seek and apply political solutions to human and social problems that at best are useless and at worst harmful. For the way in which we conceive of the proper functions of the state, the limitations which ought to be imposed upon its activities or the lack of limitations, will depend upon what we think about the capacities and predispositions of men and the purpose of human existence.

It is my conviction, shared by many others and based upon a study of the historical evidence, that the present-day crisis in which we find ourselves is in large part the product of the unsuccessful attempt of modern times to found our political philosophies and systems of government upon a conception of man that ignores or minimizes his capacity for evil and hence has no adequate means of dealing with it. It is impossible within the scope of this essay to do more than suggest what I mean but I have tried in another place to explain what I mean in more detail and with considerable

more evidence than can be brought forth here.[8] As a consequence I shall simply summarize a few of my conclusions.

III.

Ever since the seventeenth century we have been experimenting with the possibility of "freeing" ourselves from the Christian revelation. Divorcing reason from faith, rejecting the belief that man is the dependent creature of God, we have progressively put our faith in the autonomy of human reason and human will. For a time we sought to preserve the Christian ethics while at the same time we rejected the Christian religion. This experiment has borne fruit in the twentieth century in the repudiation of reason, in the deterioration of the Christian conscience, and in the enslavement of men's bodies and souls under the yoke of totalitarian tyranny.

For a long time the dominant climate of opinion politically was that of liberalism. As originally conceived by men like John Locke, for example, liberalism embodied an uneasy compromise between the Christian beliefs of the Middle Ages and the secular philosophy of the Renaissance. Incompatible ideas were merged. It accepted, for example, the Christian conception of the absolute value of human personality and the spiritual equality of individuals. But it radically departed from the Christian tradition in asserting its belief in the autonomy of individual will and in the essential goodness of man. It posited the existence of a transcendental order of truth which was accessible to man's natural reason and capable of evoking a moral response and it sought to reconcile the autonomous will of the individual with the demands of this transcendental order through appeals to individual conscience. Thus individual conscience is the keystone of the whole liberal structure for it is upon individual conscience that the choice between order and anarchy ultimately devolves. In the seventeenth century that conscience was still a Christian conscience but it could not and did not long survive the attempt to separate the Christian ethic from the Christian religion. What appeared "self-evidently" true to the seventeenth-century mind that was still close to the mediaeval Christian tradition was destined to appear less self-evident as the

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[8] See J. H. Hallowell, *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought* (New York, 1950).

mind of men progressively "freed" itself from the Christian revelation and the authority of the Church.

With the progressive deterioration of the Christian conscience and the substitution in the nineteenth century, through the influence of positivism, of an immanent conception of order, freedom rapidly degenerated into license and the will of men was left without any substantive restraints. Formal procedure alone imposed limitations and since these were but formal limitations they proved to be no real limitations at all. It was no longer a question of "what" one did that was important but "how" one did it. For the early liberal freedom under the law meant freedom from unjust compulsion but to the positivistically minded liberal of the nineteenth century it came to mean simply freedom from illegal compulsion. When the conception of legality was divorced from the conception of justice and positive law was declared to be the only true law, freedom came to mean that the individual was free to do whatever the state had not yet forbidden him to do. Under the influence of positivism the rights of individuals were conceived more and more simply to be concessions to individual claims which the state might or might not choose to make. Although liberalism originally arose in opposition to tyranny it gradually degenerated under the impact of positivism into a theory that was entirely congenial with the rise of tyranny.

Lulled into complacent self-satisfaction by the liberal positivistic doctrine of the nineteenth century, modern man became a blind devotee of the Goddess Progress who, he believed, bestowed her blessings upon man in the form of increased knowledge and control over nature through an automatic and impersonal process, in which man, at best, was but a passive tool of Nature or of History. Where in former times men had looked to God for the salvation of their souls, they now looked to science and technology for the gratification of their desires. Paradise on earth was substituted for eternal spiritual salvation as an aspiration worthy of men's efforts. And this paradise on earth waited only upon the proper execution of a plan to be discovered in the truths and with the methods of the natural sciences. It required no sacrifice on the part of man, no change in his way of life, no moderation of his appetites— it required simply the application of intelligence, directed by science, to social problems. Progress was conceived as automatic, irreversi-

ble, and inevitable. Time alone would heal all wounds, cure all evils, and solve all problems. This, at least, was man's fervent hope and his faith.

But the optimism that characterized the nineteenth century has given way in the twentieth to a deep-rooted despair. Most men today no longer believe that progress is automatic, irreversible or inevitable, though many still cling, if with much less assurance than formerly, to a belief in science and technology as the way out of our difficulties. With the invention of the atom bomb and work begun upon a bomb of even greater destructive power modern man realizes, if he has not realized it before, that the blessings of science are not unmixed, that science can be used for evil purposes as well as good and that science itself is silent as to the use which shall and should be made of its products. Evil has manifested itself so unmistakably in the twentieth century that modern man finds it increasingly difficult to deny its existence, even if he still has considerable difficulty calling it by name.

The liberals of the last century denied the reality of evil and ascribed the appearance of evil in the world to faulty political institutions and to lack of "enlightenment." They proposed to eliminate this "evil" by education and political reform. The Marxians ascribed the appearance of evil in the world to the prevailing capitalistic mode of production, to the private ownership of the means of production and to the class conflict engendered by that institution. Evil would disappear inevitably and automatically, they predicted, with the establishment of a classless society through the medium of revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. With the distribution of material goods in accordance with men's needs, men would no longer be frustrated in their search for material satisfaction and all evil would disappear. Both liberals and Marxians ascribed whatever evil there is in the world to bad or faulty institutions. But why these institutions, political and economic, should be so bad, and so much in need of reform, if men are essentially good is a question to which neither liberalism nor Marxism has a very satisfactory answer.

In recent years one of America's most astute thinkers, Reinhold Niebuhr, has recalled to our consciousness a fact which both liberalism and Marxism have ignored with almost fatal consequences to our civilization. Evil, he points out, is something real, not an ap-

pearance only, and the proper name for it is sin. Its locus is not in institutions, which are but a reflection of human purposes, but in human nature itself. It is pride, self-righteousness, greed, envy, hatred and sloth that are the real evils and the ones from which social evils spring. When man is thwarted in his attempts to realize justice it is because he is thwarted by his own sinful predisposition. The recognition of this inherent predisposition to sin helps to explain why the best laid plans of men never quite succeed.

The deficiency of both liberal and Marxist social theory, "is derived from their common effort to understand man without considering the final dimension of his spirit: his transcendent freedom over both the natural and historical process in which he is involved. This freedom accounts for both the creative and destructive possibilities in human history."[4] It is the transcendence of man's spirit over the physical and historical processes which distinguishes man from the beast. It is for this reason that man can never be completely comprehended or explained in physical terms alone. The sex impulse which man shares with the animal is never as purely biological in man as it is in the beast. Sex in man is bound up with love and when man endeavors to make the sexual act a purely biological experience it is only by an act of perversion that he is able to do so. Only man is capable of perverting his natural impulses, animals are not. The same thing is true of economic desires. They are never purely biological but they, too, have a spiritual dimension. Professor Niebuhr has explained this very well when he says:

> Economic desires are never merely the expression of the hunger or the survival impulse in human life. The desires for "power and glory" are subtly compounded with the more primeval impluse. The lion's desire for food is satisfied when his maw is crammed. Man's desire for food is more easily limited than other human desires; yet the hunger impluse is subject to the endless refinements and perversions of the gourmand. Shelter and raiment have much more extensible limits than food. Man's coat is never merely a cloak for his nakedness but the badge of his vocation, or the expression of an artistic impulse, or a method of attracting the other sex, or a proof of social position. Man's house is not merely his shelter but, even

[4] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York, 1944), pp. 59-60.

more than his raiment, the expression of his personality and the symbol of his power, position and prestige.[5]

Marx believed that with the coming of Communism it would be possible to satisfy men's wants, that no one would want more than "enough," and that when these material wants were satisfied all crime would disappear and everyone would live forever after in peace and harmony with his neighbor. But his hope is a delusion for it is based upon a conception of human nature that is false. It ignores the spiritual dimensions of men's wants which are never purely biological or material, but are always compounded with a desire for power and for glory.

The crisis of our times manifests itself most vividly in the rise of the totalitarian dictatorship and in the contempt for human personality that grows everywhere more ominous. Because men have lost sight of the image of God in man, man has become progressively dehumanized. The inhumanity of man to man has manifested itself in varying degrees throughout the ages man has lived but not until modern times has man's inhumanity to man been pursued as a matter of principle. As one writer points out:

> We are entering an inhuman world, a world of inhumanness, inhuman not merely in fact, but in principle as well. Inhumanity has begun to be presented as something noble, surrounded with an aureole of heroism. Over against man there rises a class or a race, a deified collective or state . . . No longer is every man held to be a man, a value, the image and likeness of God . . . the old bestialism, naive, barbarian, instinctive, was not self-conscious, deliberate, the product of reflection and civilization, self-justified . . .
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> The new world which is taking form is moved by other values than the value of man or of human personality, or the value of truth: it is moved by such values as power, technics, race- purity, nationality, the state, the collective. The will to justice is overcome by the will to power. The dialectic of this process is very delicate. Man desires power, power for himself, but this leads him to put power above self, above man; it leads him to readiness to sacrifice his own humanity for the sake of power. Power is objectified and drawn away from human existence. Such values as those of technics, the state, the race or the class bestialize man: for the sake of these sorts of power, any desired treatment of the individual is permitted.[6]

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[5] *Ibid,* pp. 61-62.

[6] Nicholas Berdyaev, *The Fate of Man in the Modern World* (London, 1935). pp. 28 ff.

Having alienated himself from God, having discredited the reason with which he was endowed by God, unable or unwilling to identify the evil in the world for what it is—modern man oscillates between extravagant optimism and hopeless despair. As his optimism is shattered more and more by the force of events he sinks lower and lower into the slough of despond. In his despondency he is tempted to strike out against the enemy he cannot identify, whose name he does not know, in desperate action. In his anxiety to escape from utter futility and a meaningless existence, he is tempted to give up his most priceless heritage—his freedom—to any man or movement which even promises deliverance from insecurity and futility. He is tempted to put his faith in the most absurd doctrine, to submit his will to the most brutal dictator, if only he can find that which he longs for with all the passion of his being—a meaningful existence, a life worth living, a way of life worth dying to preserve. Men have turned away from God only to worship false gods and have demonstrated that men's religious aspirations cannot be denied, though they may be perverted.

Today we are confronted with just such a perverted religion, namely, Communism. And we have underestimated its power because we have underestimated the passion which informs it. It is not simply an economic doctrine, a political theory, a different social system but a gospel of salvation through revolution. It promises men deliverance from exploitation and oppression through the medium of revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat and it embodies a faith for which men are willing to die. The answer to it does not lie ultimately in the atom bomb nor in superior military strength but in a faith that is stronger because it is based upon a conception of man and his destiny that is truer. Our civilization hangs on the brink of the abyss not simply because of the external threats that confront it but because of the internal disintegration of the faith upon which that civilization was established. That faith has its roots in Greek philosophy, in Hebrew prophecy, in Roman law and, especially, in the Christian religion.

For Christianity has taught us to respect every individual as a soul created in the image and likeness of God, to recognize that (irrespective of our color, our race or our creed) we are all children of the same God. It has taught us that, because we have a destiny that transcends time and, as a consequence, responsibilities

that transcend the demands of the particular time and society in which we live, we must have the freedom proportionate to those responsibilities and the rights that are derived from those obligations. It has taught us that there is a law greater than the law of any state, that there is a will greater than the will of any individual or majority of individuals, and that no state can claim our total allegiance. It has taught us that the state exists to promote the good of human persons, that the state exists for men, not men for the state. It has taught us to establish just relations among men but to administer justice with the compassionate knowledge that other men's sins are our own sins and that in their sinning we sin as well. It has taught us, where possible with God's help, to go beyond the demands of justice and to love one another as God loves us. It has taught us that the redemption of the world and of ourselves is not an undertaking for which we are alone responsible, that God is merciful and stands ready to forgive and help those who ask his forgiveness and help. It has taught us that only by aiming above the world can we hope to transform and master the world.[7]

Christianity is not a political philosophy nor an economic program and it provides no short cuts to economic prosperity, social stability, or political order. It does not lessen the need to study our political, social, and economic institutions and to institute reforms or formulate programs which may improve our political and social structure. But it does give us a perspective and provide us with principles in terms of which we may accomplish these tasks better than we would without them. It saves us, moreover, from the illusion that we can establish a system which is perfect or make a reform which is final. Christianity provides us with a realistic conception of man which neither overrates man's motives nor underestimates his potentialities. If man is a sinner, he is also, potentially, a saint. The Christian understanding of man helps us to avoid the extremes both of illusive optimism and of hopeless despair. Christianity enables us to place our political, social, and economic aspirations in proper perspective, subordinating them to an aspiration which should include but transcend them. For no political, social or economic system is an end in itself, all systems

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[7] For an introduction to the Christian faith see A. E. Taylor, *Does God Exist?* (New York, 1947); C. S. Lewis, *The Case for Christianity* (New York, 1944), *The Problem of Pain* (New York, 1945), *Miracles* (New York, 1947).

are but means to a more ultimate end and they are good only to the extent that they assist individuals to realize their potentialities as human beings who belong ultimately to God. Christ taught us not to seek peace, or security, or happiness but to seek *first* the Kingdom of God and His righteousness and promised us that if we did so we should then attain the only lasting peace, security and happiness there is.

There is a truth in liberalism, according to one writer, which modern liberal thought has tried to preserve without its foundations.

> The truth of the liberal idea is that man cannot be confined to his political relationships. He is more than a brick in the social edifice. 'The Christian Revolution' in the ancient world was an affirmation of this truth based upon the positive doctrine of man as a creature of God, with his life reaching out to an eternal world and thereby affecting his life in this . . .
>
> Modern liberal thought tried to preserve the truth without its foundations. It affirmed the dignity of the human person, not in the name of something larger than his social relationships would warrant, but of something smaller. It claimed liberty for the individual man, not on the ground that man is a creature with one part of his being in the eternal world, but on the ground that as a political atom he has a right to exist in himself . . . Instead of claiming liberties *for* the pursuit of positive social purposes directed by man's spiritual relationships, it encouraged demands for liberty *from* this or that encroachment . . .
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> In consequence of liberalism's emancipation from the religious basis of freedom for positive ends, the modern world has earned, not a secular freedom, but a drift towards social disintegration that is sending men in self-protection into the arms of oppressive collectivisms.
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> Our task is therefore to recover, in the conditions of the present world, that positively religious conception of human life that will alone save us from the consequence of the assumption that the State is the source of community instead of an instrument of it . . . It has been for want of an organic relation between man's secular and spiritual life that the natural social functions of industry, commerce, education, family and regional politics have lost a sense of purpose . . .
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> The 'primacy of the spiritual' must be upheld, not as a retreat from the secular tasks of life, but as a condition of handling them aright.[8]

[8] V. A. Demant, *Theology of Society* (London, 1947), pp. 64-65, 66.

Freedom is not an end in itself but a means only and only when it is directed by the love of God to do His will here on earth do we genuinely experience it. Only in "perfect service" to God is there "perfect freedom."

> To the Christian, therefore, man is made for community not only through his membership in a particular human group but also by virtue of his membership in the family of God. Nature and history have bound him to his fellows in the group by ties of sex, blood, division of labor, language, and tradition. But over and above these ties there is a spiritual bond which unites him to the universal community of those who seek to do God's will through love of their neighbors. This community is actual in the Church which is its first-fruits, but ideally it should include all humanity. It will, of course, never be realized fully among the kingdoms of this world, for the forces of egoism and pride are arrayed against it. But those whose first loyalty is to it must seek, wherever they are, a form of society which will provide an order of justice and good will and thus approximate in some measure the more perfect love of the Kingdom.[9]

The Christian insists that the only genuine and solid basis of community is love and justice. Such a conception of the community provides us not only with a standard of judgment upon every society but suggests a way in which we may work for that which all of us long, namely a world community. To a world plunged into despair, anxious and frantic in its search for some measure of security, the Christian hope shines like a star in the heavens, a beacon to all men of good will.

But until we have brought order out of the riot of our desires, until we have ordered our own souls, we cannot expect to create order in the world. The disorder in the world is but a reflection of the disorder in our own lives. The matter has been put succinctly in the epistle of James when he says: "From whence come wars and fightings among you? come they not hence even of your lusts that war in your members? Ye lust and have not; ye kill, and desire to have, and cannot obtain: ye fight and war, yet ye have not, because ye ask not. Ye ask, and receive not, because ye ask amiss, that ye may consume it upon your lusts." (4:1-3) A modern writer has expressed it in this way:

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[9] George F. Thomas, "Christianity and Democracy" in *The Vitality of the Christian Tradition* (New York, 1944), p. 353.

We express no hyperbole in asserting that what is, humanly speaking, the greatest of all achievements, the rebuilding of a civilization, must yet, in the language of ultimate seriousness, be described as a by-work. It is true, as organizers of the peace of the world we must strain every nerve to push on in the direction in which the Charter of the United Nations points. As organizers of justice at home we must strive with might and main to discard the social evils created by the capitalist system. But in so doing we shall remember that except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain that build it. The very devotion which we give to the labor of construction must flow from a greater devotion, and all the self-giving love which we put into our handiwork must be a sacrifice and thank-offering. Organizing peace on earth is a gigantic task. To be successful in it, in a measure, we shall have to conceive of it not in the spirit of a giant world-builder (the giant might soon discover that he is a pygmy) but of a copyist, with the peace of God before us as a model.[10]

IV.

Something remains to be said about the obligations of the teacher of political science. Whether the teacher be a teacher of political science or of any other subject the obligations will be very much the same. Certainly it is the paramount obligation of every teacher to find and disseminate the truth to the best of his ability. If he is loyal to this objective we can tolerate every divergence of opinion, expect that there will be wide divergences, and we can hope that out of the arguments and counter arguments generated by these differences of opinion that we shall come closer to the absolute truth which eludes us all. What is not tolerable is the belief, often feigned, that there is no truth about anything. For if there is no truth about anything the whole learning and teaching process is meaningless. Education degenerates into sophistry and learning becomes propaganda. To say that it is the obligation of every teacher to pursue the truth is not the same thing as to say that he has the truth. None of us ever knows the whole truth about anything and everyone's grasp of the truth he does know will be mixed with error. But only if we are in *search* of the truth will we be enabled to correct one another's errors and arrive at a truth that is more complete.

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[10] Helmut Kuhn, "The Classical Christian Tradition and the Emerging World," *Theology Today* (Jan. 1946), p. 449.

It is only in terms of a truth which is absolute, universal and eternal that we can say that individual judgments concerning that truth are relative, partial, and particular. To assert, as is common today, that "all truth is relative" is to speak of contradiction, for we cannot even assert this as truth without denying what we have just said. From the fact that individual conceptions of the truth are always incomplete and partially in error, it does not logically follow that all truth is relative but rather that all individuals are fallible. This does not mean that all individual judgments are equally fallible for there are degrees of truth and degrees of fallibility. It seems to me that the contention which we frequently encounter today, that there is no truth because all individual judgments are fallible is a confession not of humility but of despair, not of contrition but of loss of faith. Although genuine humility is a virtue and one that ought to be cultivated by teachers especially, we should not mistake despair of finding the truth for humility. G. K. Chesterton has pointed out that:

> . . . what we suffer from today is humility in the wrong place. Modesty has moved from the organ of ambition. Modesty has settled upon the organ of conviction; where it was never meant to be. A man was meant to be doubtful about himself, but undoubting about the truth; this has been exactly reversed. Nowadays the part of a man that a man does assert is exactly the part he ought not to assert—himself. The part he doubts is exactly the part he ought not to doubt—the Divine Reason. Huxley preached a humility content to learn from Nature. But the new sceptic is so humble that he doubts if he can learn . . . The old humility made a man doubtful about his efforts, which might make him work harder. But the new humility makes a man doubtful about his aims, which will make him stop working altogether . . . We are on the road to producing a race of men too modest to believe in the multiplication table. We are in danger of seeing philosophers who doubt the law of gravity as being a mere fancy of their own. Scoffers of old times were too proud to be convinced; but these are too humble to be convinced. The meek do inherit the earth; but the modern sceptics are too meek even to claim their inheritance.[11]

Despair disguised as humility and indifference parading as tolerance are manifestations of the sickness of the modern world. It is not our reason that we should distrust but ourselves and only if

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[11] G. K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy* (New York, 1947), pp. 55-56.

our love of truth is greater than our fear of error can we learn anything. The most humbling experience of all is the search for truth and if we would cultivate humility there is no better way than trying to find the truth. It is not the scholar and teacher who is in search of the truth that menaces the educational process but the teacher who contends that there is no such thing as truth but only opinion. For such a belief leads to a dogmatism that is impervious to argument and inaccessible to rational scrutiny. You can argue with a man who believes in the truth but you can't argue with a man who says everything is a matter of opinion.

The teacher has not only the obligation to present the truth of any matter as he conceives it to be but also to explain how he arrived at it. He will not insist, of course, that his students agree with everything he has said but he will let the argument and the evidence speak for itself. He will himself be receptive to counter argument and counter evidence and will encourage his students to take issue with him when they feel so inclined. The atmosphere of the classroom should be one of tolerance but not one of anarchy. To the extent that it is humanly possible, reason and not personality should dominate the proceedings.

One of the most common complaints among students today is that their professors are reluctant to tell them "what they believe." And I think the students are often justified in their complaint. For if the teacher who has been trained as a specialist in some particular field of inquiry refuses to venture any opinion of his own, to whom is the student to turn for counsel? If the student knows as much as the teacher does, if his judgment is just as good as the teacher's, why is the teacher teaching and the student learning? Of course no teacher is infallible but one need not be infallible in order to venture an opinion. The students are impatient, and rightly so, with an "objectivity" which refrains from decisions, for objectivity does not mean that we should have no opinions at all but rather that our opinions should be based upon reason and objective evidence. The practical consequences of an "objectivity" which refrains from decisions have been amply documented by Julien Benda in his *Treason of the Intellectuals* and we saw in the rise of Nazism in Germany how the "objectivity" of German university professors contributed to that end. If professors of political science have nothing important or significant to say about political policies and

decisions they cannot very well complain when their students turn to demagogues for more specific instruction.

Some teachers may reply that the function of the teacher, as they conceive it, is to teach students to think but not to think anything in particular. This, I believe, is an impossibility, for you can only learn to think by thinking *about* something. There is no such thing as "thinking" in the abstract. A person can no more think and yet think nothing than he can see and yet see nothing. To think means to think about something and arrive at some conclusion, however tentative.

The teacher has an obligation not only to explain how he arrives at his conclusions, by what process of reasoning and in the light of what evidence, but also to share with his students the presuppositions in the light of which he examines the evidence and follows his reason. For underlying all of our thinking there are certain presuppositions in the light of which thought is made possible. Very often we are unaware of the existence of these presuppositions but they are there nevertheless and one of our tasks is to uncover them. Not all of us, of course, have the same presuppositions but all of us do begin our thinking, of necessity, from certain principles which we regard as true and in the light of which we interpret what we observe. The presuppositions in terms of which we identify facts are as important as are the facts themselves. We have an obligation as teachers, therefore, not only to present the facts but also the presuppositions, so far as we know what they are, in terms of which we recognize certain things as facts.

There is a rather sizable group among us which contends that it has no presuppositions. These are the positivists. They reject all metaphysical speculation and ethical evaluation as irrelevant, yet in rejecting it as irrelevant they, too, begin their thinking from a premise which they accept as self-evidently true. And, as a matter of fact, the positivist can achieve *meaning* for the facts which he describes only by engaging in the kind of metaphysical speculation he denounces as improper. When he insists that we should confine ourselves to the description of those "positive facts" which can be observed without transcending our immediate sensory experience, he is insisting upon the impossible, for it is only in terms of categories that precede our experience that we are able to experience anything at all. Far from abandoning metaphysical specula-

tion and ethical evaluation the positivist, of necessity, indulges in it unconsciously and uncritically. By claiming that his conclusions are "scientifically" rather than metaphysically derived he removes his metaphysical presuppositions from the scrutiny and criticism of reason. The very causal principle in terms of which he seeks to explain things is not itself provable by the methods of science but is a metaphysical principle which science must accept in order to do its work. Science itself rests upon a faith in a kind of universe the existence of which it cannot prove by scientific methods but the existence of which it must assume if science is to do its work.

The positivist who claims that his conclusions are true, and, of course, all positivists make this claim, must necessarily transcend the empirical observation of successive events. The positivist starts, as the late Professor Alfred N. Whitehead has pointed out, from "an instinctive faith that there is an Order of Nature which can be traced in every detailed occurrence," and tends to believe that the reason for his faith is "the apprehension of its truth." But, as Whitehead cautions, "the formation of a general idea—such as the idea of the Order of Nature—and the grasp of its importance and the observation of its exemplification in a variety of occasions are by no means the necessary consequences of the truth of the idea in question."[12] The world as the positivist sees it "exhibits . . . an involution of paths and a concatenation of circumstances which have arisen entirely by chance. We can describe what has happened but with that description all possibility of knowledge ends."[13] But to claim *truth* for this description the positivist must transcend the methods of science. As one writer has put it:

> To retain . . . the distinction of truth and falsity *even for science alone* we have to enlarge the scientific world and in enlarging it to modify it deeply, for what is added is not something of the same order but something different in kind, not having even an analogy with the rest. Knowing the process that has to other events the unique relation of apprehending them, is above the causal order, in the sense that, although in it, it also knows it. Science as knowing transcends the scientific world; its claim to be true lifts it above the type of order its content depicts. Deny the claim and the content is worthless; admit the claim and the content is set in a larger context. Science can

[12] A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York, 1925).
[13] Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York, 1933), p. 157.

explain things naturally, but never itself. It cannot be true in a purely scientific world.[14]

The only rational motive for seeking to understand political institutions and behavior is the human benefit that may be derived from such a study. If our interest in politics is unrelated to human welfare and to such concepts as justice and freedom, there is, of course, no reason why we should seek to describe political behavior in ethical terms. But if our interest in politics is motivated by an interest in human well being, it becomes not only our right, but our responsibility, to detect corruption, to identify injustice and tyranny, to unmask sophistry, and to guide men along the paths most likely to yield happiness and freedom. With Plato and Aristotle, I believe that the social sciences can be most useful to our society when they are deliberately, consciously, and rationally directed toward helping men to be better human beings—when they seek to discover the principles that make for a free and just society and encourage men by the best means at their disposal to put those principles into practice. If it were true that "good government" is simply a matter of each man's private definition there could be no government at all.

Research, however dispassionate and detached in its methods, achieves meaning and can lay claim to truth only by transcending itself, only by relating itself to something of significance beyond its immediate concern. Political science achieves meaning only by presupposing that the fruits of its research are of value to human beings who have a capacity to reason, to choose between alternative modes of behavior, to differentiate good from bad, and who have a destiny that transcends the demands of time and place. If we deny these attributes of humanity, we deny at the same time any possibility of understanding political behavior rationally, *i.e.,* the possibility of political science. It would, indeed, simplify the task of political science if man were an automaton controlled by forces completely outside his own control—except that there would then be no political scientists to understand the mechanism.

Finally, what place does religion, and more especially Christianity, have in the classroom? There are a great many who will contend that it has no place at all. Others will say that the only legiti-

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[14] T. E. Jessop, "The Scientific Account of Man," in T. E. Jessop *et al., The Christian Understanding of Man* (London, 1938), p. 40.

mate place for it is in a department of religion. Those who contend that religion has no place at all in the classroom, if pressed for reasons, will generally argue (1) that religion is a subjective, personal matter and that there is no place in the classroom for subjective, personal feelings, (2) that it is based on faith and authority and has nothing, therefore, to do with that which is rational, (3) that since all students are not Christians it will offend those who are not. Let us examine these arguments in more detail.

(1) There is a sense, of course, in which religion is a subjective and personal matter but there is also a sense in which it is an objective fact and can be dealt with as such. It is a fact that there is such a thing as Christianity and that it has exerted a profound influence upon our thinking and institutions. To understand this influence is essential whether one is himself a Christian or not. To understand the origins of constitutional government it is necessary to understand the common distinction that was made in the Middle Ages between a true prince and a tyrant and the mediaeval conception of law out of which modern constitutionalism emerged. And in order to understand the political theory of the Middle Ages it is essential to know something about the doctrinal and theological basis upon which that political theory rested. Even if we confine our attention to "modern times" as some political scientists think we should, we will find it necessary to know something about Christianity. If we would understand what liberalism is, for example, and how it arose we must understand the Deism which was intimately connected with it. But in order to understand Deism we would have to know how it modified the orthodox Christian doctrines. Locke's essay on *The Reasonableness of Christianity* is as essential to the understanding of his thought as is his *Treatise on Civil Government.* Almost a half of Hobbes' *Leviathan* is devoted to a discussion "of a Christian Commonwealth" and it will make little or no sense to us unless we know what the doctrines of orthodox Christianity are and mean. And although a great deal of modern political thought rejects Christianity it retains a great deal of it in a secularized and distorted form. To adequately understand the secularized form, even though we may approve of it, it is essential to know just how it differs from the Christian belief which it rejects. The modern doctrine of progress, for example, is understandable only as a secularized version of the Christian

doctrine of Providence. We may personally prefer the doctrine of progress to the doctrine of Providence but if we would understand the idea of progress we would have to know something about the doctrine of Providence from which it is derived. To understand Marx it is essential to know the religious presuppositions which he derived, in part, from Feuerbach.

If we would understand the role of the Christian Democratic Party in Germany today and of similar parties in other European countries it would certainly be of help to know what the Christian basis for these parties is. If we would understand American institutions it would be of help to know something about the Puritan tradition and beliefs out of which many of these institutions grew. Ralph Barton Perry has suggested some of the connections in a book entitled *Puritanism and Democracy*. A knowledge of the religious beliefs and institutions of the Far and Near East will certainly be essential to an understanding of the political and social institutions peculiar to these regions.

Religion certainly has a legitimate place in the classroom as one of the important factors which has exerted and continues to exert a profound influence upon our political thinking and institutions. And as such a factor we certainly should be able to treat it with the same kind of objectivity that we employ to discuss other factors. The word "objective," however, does have curious connotations in our modern vocabulary. As a student I have heard Christianity disparaged and ridiculed in the classroom more often than I have heard it praised, but rarely, if ever, have I heard this practice condemned as an injection of personal bias. The attitude of disparagement is often labeled "objective" while the attitude of praise is condemned as "subjective." Genuine objectivity would demand, it seems to me, that we attempt, subject to the human limitations which bind us all, to describe the doctrines of Christianity as accurately as we can and to explain the influence of Christianity and the role of the Church as accurately as we would describe the influence and activity of any other doctrine or institution. This may well involve both criticism and praise where each is justified and the reasons for each are clearly stated. Criticism and praise alike become subjective when the reasons for these attitudes are never explained and when they spring from personal bias rather than from objective evidence.

(2) Another reason that is sometimes advanced for excluding religion from the classroom is the argument that since it is based on faith and authority it is intellectually disreputable. If we were to exclude from consideration in the classroom everything that is based on faith and authority we would have to exclude probably ninety per cent of what is taught there. All of the historical facts which we accept as true we accept not on the evidence of our own experience but on the authority of the historian. I am told by the historian that a man by the name of George Washington was born in 1732 and died in 1799, that he served as Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Army and was the first president of the United States. All of this, and a great deal more beside, I accept on the authority of the historian and I accept it on the same basis that I accept the fact that Jesus Christ was born in Palestine. I have never been in India but I am certain there is such a place and I accept its existence on authority. When the physicist tells me that the hard surface on which I write is, in reality, a moving mass of molecules I accept his statement on authority. When the physician prescribes penicillin for my children I administer it to them on his authority and with faith in his judgment.

The difference between science and religion is not, as some erroneously suppose, that one is based on reason and the other on faith for as a matter of fact both are based on faith. As I have said earlier, and as A. N. Whitehead has demonstrated in considerable detail, science assumes the existence of a kind of universe the existence of which it can never prove by its own methods. Its ultimate basis is not something which rests upon empirical evidence but upon faith. This in no way discredits its methods or findings and no one suggests that we should exclude it from the classroom.

That Christianity excludes all rational considerations is palpably false, as anyone who has read the great works of Christian thought can readily testify. As a matter of fact one of the greatest of Christian thinkers, St. Thomas Aquinas, is sometimes criticized on the grounds that he was too rigorously rational. No thinker before or since has had a greater respect for logic. Indeed, it is one of the claims of Christianity, and one to which many Christians can testify, that rather than shackling reason the Christian faith provides insights and understanding which increase rather than diminish the role of reason in life. It is faith that sustains our reason

and gives it direction. It is true that Christianity rejects the Cartesian conception of man as a "thinking thing" but only to insist that man is a creature of passion as well as an intellect and that passion plays a role in the search for truth that is at least as important as reason. Man, it insists, is not a disembodied mind but a creature capable of loving, hating, and willing. The acquisition of truth is an activity not only of the intellect but of the will and it is the direction of our will that directs our reason. We learn and know only what we want to learn and know and where there is no will to learn, nothing can be taught. The conversion of our will is equally as important as the use of our reason. This truth is expressed in the oft repeated maxim that "a man convinced against his will is of the same opinion still."

At any rate it seems clear enough to me that if it is legitimate to present arguments in the classroom which disparage man's rationality, and there are many such arguments presented today, it is equally as legitimate to present arguments which uphold his rationality. If it is legitimate, for example, to study the writings of Pareto, it is equally as legitimate to study the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas and let the students decide which is the more rigorous thinker. Professor Hoxie N. Fairchild put the matter aptly in another pamphlet in this series when he said: "Those who hold that it has become desirable or necessary to do without religion must at least be prepared to describe what it is they are abandoning and what they propose to substitute for it. At present there is a marked revival of religion among members of the intellectual class. Whether this is a retreat from reason or a reassertion of the possibility of reason is a debatable question. By all means, then, let it be debated."[15]

(3) An additional argument that would exclude religion from the classroom is that since all students are not Christians it will offend those who are not. But there is no reason why a discussion of the meaning and influence of Christianity should offend anyone. It would be offensive if the teacher insisted that students agree with everything that he said but such an attitude on the part of the teacher would be offensive whether he was talking about religion or anything else. If the presentation is offensive it will not

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[15] H. N. Fairchild, *Religious Perspectives in College Teaching: In English Literature,* p. 6.

be because the subject discussed is religion but because of the manner in which it is discussed. My own experience has been that rather than resenting the discussion of religion students have welcomed it. Indeed, they often want to go much further with the discussion than time and the subject matter permits and this holds true not only of Christians among the students but also of non-Christians and sceptics.

Another group argues that the only legitimate place for religion in the classroom is in a department of religion. Members of this group think of religion as a subject separate and distinct from all other subjects and while they think it has its place in a university curriculum they want to make sure that it keeps its place and doesn't intrude upon other subjects. This attitude arises from a false conception of the nature and meaning of religion. Religion as we have been told many times is not just a subject for Sunday meditation but it has a bearing upon everything we do and think seven days a week. It is an attempt, moreover, to see things whole, to bring, in the words of one writer, all our "fragmentary truths and values into unity by relating them to an infinite Reality and Goodness which transcends them all."[16] In its search for organic unity religion is somewhat like philosophy and while we have separate departments of philosophy we do not think it illegitimate, I hope, for historians, economists, students of literature, or political scientists to bring philosophical considerations into the discussion of the problem of their respective disciplines. I can see no essential difference between discussing philosophy in the classroom and discussing religion. The department of philosophy has no monopoly on philosophy and neither does the department of religion have a monopoly on religion.

There is a great deal of talk among college and university teachers today about the importance of "integrating" our teaching, breaking across arbitrary departmental barriers and promoting interdisciplinary projects. But if we are to relate one subject to another it must be in terms of something which transcends them both. In religion, which is concerned with the whole of a man's life, with the totality of his experience, we have a body of thought and of experience that sheds light on all aspects of human experience and,

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[16] George F. Thomas, *Religion in an Age of Secularism.* An inaugural lecture published by Princeton University, p. 16.

as a consequence, can integrate subjects, particularly among the humanities and the social sciences, as nothing else can. Indeed, the origin of universities lay in just such a conviction. And to the extent that universities have lost the faith that originally inspired them they have progressively lost the unity of purpose that made one out of many. The first college in America, Harvard College, was founded "in *Christi Gloriam,*" in the conviction that there could be no true knowledge or wisdom without Christ. Those today who are urging the colleges and universities to put religion back into higher education are not urging something upon them that is alien to their nature but are suggesting only that they revive the faith that originally inspired their founding.

VI

What are the special responsibilities of the teacher of political science who is also a practicing Christian? Upon him, it seems to me, falls the special responsibility of relating his Christian beliefs to political science in general and to the particular area within political science that is his speciality. Many do so but there are many who do not. Many endeavor, and apparently with some success, to keep their personal commitments and their academic activities in water-tight compartments. How they manage it I am not sure. Some, perhaps, would argue that the practicing of Christianity is a matter of personal conduct and not an intellectual activity. But what one does with one's mind is certainly as important as what one does with one's body and soul. Certainly a Christian life is the best witness to Christianity that anyone can make and it is much to be preferred to an intellectual commitment that is not reflected in personal living. But personal conduct and intellectual activity are not mutually exclusive activities and we need not, I think, choose between them. In actuality the one will reinforce the other. It is something like the relationship between faith and good works; each is essential to the other and each is reflected by the other. The psychologists talk a great deal today about the importance of "integrating" one's personality and if they are right it would seem that a Christian who was a Christian in his intellectual activities as well as in the affairs of personal conduct would be apt to achieve a more "integrated" personality than the

one who kept his intellectual activities and his personal life in separate compartments.

The Christian has an opportunity through his writings and in the classroom to bear witness to Christianity intellectually and it is an opportunity, I think, that he is not only justified in using but that he would be remiss to neglect. When the opportunity legitimately arises he is certainly justified in explaining the light which Christianity sheds on the problem under consideration, explaining any misconceptions of Christianity that he may discover among his students and answering any questions that are directed to him about the nature or teachings of the Christian religion. If asked why he holds the beliefs that he does he is certainly justified in explaining.

The teacher who interprets his subject matter in the light of Christian doctrines and philosophy is no less scholarly or less worthy of intellectual respect than the teacher who interprets his subject matter in the light of Hegelian idealism or logical positivism. We do not think it strange that many different varieties of philosophy are represented in most departments of philosophy, that some teach as pragmatists, others as idealists, and still others as logical positivists. If this is legitimate, and I think we would agree that it is, it is equally legitimate to have the Christian philosophy represented. All political scientists whether they know it or not teach from some point of view and if they contend that all points of view are equally valid, that is a point of view. The important thing is not to have no point of view, which is an impossibility, but to make our point of view explicit. If we think we do not have a philosophical point of view we are deluding ourselves and our students. It is impossible even to observe anything and describe it except from some perspective. If a student knows what our philosophical perspective is, he can discount it if he likes but if we give him the impression that we have no perspective we are not being honest with ourselves or with him. Moreover, the student has the same right to know what Christianity is and to choose it if he desires as he has to know what pragmatism is or idealism or any of the other varieties of religious or philosophical thought.

The Christian who is also a teacher may feel reluctant to bring his Christianity into the classroom because he knows that many of his colleagues will think it an illegitimate injection of a personal

bias. Certainly there is no place in the classroom for personal bias or prejudices but Christianity is not a personal bias but includes a systematic body of thought about the most significant human problems, a body of thought that has existed for several centuries and attracted the allegiance, intellectual and personal, of countless millions of individuals. Such a body of thought deserves a hearing and there is no one better able to give it a hearing than one who is himself a Christian. If a person is to be able to judge wisely between opposing doctrines or opinions, "he must," in the words of John Stuart Mill, "be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. He must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of; else he will never really possess himself of the portion of the truth which meets and removes that difficulty."[17]

If we are to find our way out of the crisis in which we find ourselves we shall need a great deal more discussion and analysis of the great and perennial problems of human existence. Let us hear by all means what each philosophy can teach us but in all fairness to ourselves and to the truth, let us hear what Christianity has to say. And let those of us who are Christians not hide our light under a bushel but bring it forth to illumine the darkness that it may "give light unto all that are in the house."

[17] From John S. Mill's essay on "Liberty." Everyman edition, p. 97.

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